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Abstract
We consider an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents and financial market imperfections. We investigate the role of dividend
taxation on economic growth and asset price. The optimal dividend taxation is
also studied.
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1 Introduction
The interplay between financial market and production sector is an important issue
to understand the real effects of the financial sector. On the one hand, as mentioned
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the financial friction may amplify the macroeconomic
impact of the exogenous changes. On the other hand, in some situations, the financial
market may be beneficial to the production sector by providing financial support for the
purchase of the physical capital (Le Van and Pham, 2016). Few papers study financial
taxation and its role on the the interaction between financial and real sectors, in spite
of a large literature on capital and labor income taxations (Atkinson and Sandmo,
1980; Chamley, 1986; Judd, 1985; Kocherlakota, 2010). The current paper aims to
fill this gap. More precisely, we investigate the role of asset dividend taxation in an
economy with the presence of financial market imperfection. Several questions will be
addressed: How do we use dividend taxation to avoid recession and promote economic
growth and welfare? What is its impact on asset price and asset bubble? To this
purpose, we construct an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
consumers, a firm and a government. In this economy, a long-lived asset is traded and
a single good is consumed or/and used to produce. An agent buys the long-lived
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asset today and may resell it tomorrow after receiving exogenous dividends (in term
of consumption good). This asset can be interpreted as land or Lucas tree (Lucas,
1978) or security (Santos and Woodford, 1997) or stock (Kocherlakota, 1992). In the
following, it will be referred to as financial asset. Consumers may invest in physical
capital or in financial asset, and borrow by selling a financial asset within the limit of a
borrowing constraint: the repayment of each consumer cannot exceed a fraction of her
(physical) capital income. The representative firm maximizes its profit by computing
its capital demand. The government taxes the dividends on the asset. The government
spends these taxes to finance research and development (henceforth, R&D) activities
that improve in turn the firm’s productivity.1 This kind of endogenous growth is in
the spirit of Barro (1990).
After proving the existence of equilibrium, we wonder whether recessions arise and
how to avoid them with a positive growth. A recession in the productive sector is said to
appear if the capital used for production falls below some critical level, say k¯. We show
that recessions appear at infinitely many dates if the firm’s productivity is too low. The
novelty of our work is that taxation on asset dividends allows us to avoid recessions
and possibly promote economic growth according to the following mechanism: the
government levies taxes on consumers’ asset dividends and spends these taxes to finance
the R&D. The R&D then increases the Total Factor Productivity (henceforth, TFP)
and hence rules out the recessions, promoting economic growth in the end. Given
a low initial productivity, recession will be prevented and the economy may grow
without bounds if (1) the R&D process is efficient or/and (2) the dividends are high
or/and (3) the tax on dividends is high. By contrast, when these three conditions
are violated, the economy cannot escape from recession. We also compare the above
mechanism with other subsidy policies such as consumption and investment subsidies.
We prove that the only way to get unbounded growth is to invest in R&D which
improves the productivity. The current paper contributes to the endogenous growth
theory. The added-value is that our results are obtained in a model with heterogeneous
agents and borrowing constraints, which raises technical difficulties that methods in
the standard optimal growth theory (Le Van and Dana, 2003; Acemoglu, 2009) are no
longer applied. It should be noticed that our results hold for any equilibrium including
recursive ones. Although some authors (Acemoglu and Jensen, 2015; Datta et al.,
2017) study comparative statics of recursive equilibria, intertemporal equilibria in our
paper may be not recursive and therefore their methods cannot be directly applied in
our framework.
When the government increases the tax rate (τ) on dividends, the net dividends
decrease but the production level increases. Hence, the total amount of good may
decrease or increase. It is natural to study the optimal dividend taxation to grasp this
trade-off. In this respect, we assume that the government maximizes the aggregate
consumption of the economy at the steady state by choosing the tax rate. If the
TFP or the efficiency of R&D or the asset dividends are high, the government should
choose the highest feasible tax rate on dividends. By contrast, if these factors are
low, the government has to apply the lowest tax rate. In the intermediate case for
TFP, R&D and dividends, the optimal level of dividend taxation depends on these
1The reader is refereed to Alstadsaeter et al. (2015) for the role of dividend taxes on corporate
investment.
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three factors as follows. It is increasing in the R&D efficiency and the firm’s TFP,
but decreasing in the dividend. Our analysis contributes to the optimal taxation
theory. The main difference is that the standard literature (Chamley, 1986; Judd,
1985; Kocherlakota, 2010) studies capital and labor income taxations while we focus
on dividend taxation. Moreover we consider a model with heterogeneous consumers
and financial frictions while Kocherlakota (2010) studies representative agent models
without financial friction.2
The last avenue of our contribution focuses on the impact of dividend taxation on
asset price and bubbles. Following Santos and Woodford (1997), we say that an asset
bubble arises if at equilibrium the fundamental value (i.e., the sum of discounted values)
of asset dividends (after tax) exceeds the asset’s equilibrium price. Although there is a
large literature on the non-existence of rational bubble in general equilibrium models,3
few examples of bubbles of assets having positive dividends have been provided. We
present an example, inspired by Le Van and Pham (2016), where there may be continuum
of equilibria with bubble. This is when endowments of agents fluctuate over time.
Indeed, with such a fluctuation, at any date there is at least one agent who needs to
buy asset (even the asset price exceeds the fundamental value) because this agent has
to transfer her wealth from this date to the next date (this is the only way she can
smooth consumption because she is prevented from borrowing). Differently from Le
Van and Pham (2016), the asset fundamental value in our example is not monotonic
in dividends. This is from the fact that the real returns and discount factors in our
example depend on dividends through R&D investment. More interestingly, we show
that asset bubbles are more likely to arise when dividend taxes increase. The intuition
is that if such taxes increase, then the after-tax dividends decrease, which makes the
fundamental value of asset decrease and may be lower than the asset price.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and provides
some basic equilibrium properties. Section 3 investigates the role of dividend taxation
on recessions and economic growth. Section 4 studies the optimal dividend taxation.
Section 5 considers the role of dividend taxation on asset bubbles. Section 6 concludes.
Formal proofs are gathered in Appendix A.
2 Framework
Our model is based on Santos and Woodford (1997), Le Van and Pham (2016). We
consider a deterministic infinite-horizon general equilibrium model à la Ramsey. Time
is discrete: t = 0, . . . ,∞. However, we introduce two additional ingredients: a
government and an externality on the production function. So, there are three types
of agents: a representative firm without market power, m heterogeneous households
and the government.
2The representative agent in Kocherlakota (2010) faces a unique intertemporal constraint. We
refer to Aiyagari (1995) for optimal capital income taxation and Bhandari et al. (2013) for optimal
labor income taxation in models with incomplete markets.
3See Tirole (1982), Santos and Woodford (1997) or more recently Le Van and Pham (2016) and
references therein.
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Households
Each household invests in physical or financial asset, and consumes.
Consumption good: there is a single good which can be consumed or used to
produce. pt is its price at period t and ci,t the amount of good consumed by agent i.
Physical capital: δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital depreciation rate, while rt the return
of capital. If agent i buys ki,t ≥ 0 units of physical capital at date t− 1, then she will
receive in the following period (1− δ)ki,t units of physical capital (after depreciation)
and returns rtki,t.
Financial asset: if agent i buys ai,t units of financial asset at a price qt at date t, she
will receive in the following period ξt+1 units of consumption good as dividend. Then,
she will resell ai,t units of financial asset at a price qt+1. This asset takes on different
meanings: land,4 security (Santos and Woodford, 1997) or stock (Kocherlakota, 1992).
Differently from the existing literature, we introduce a government taxing the
revenue from asset dividends. For each unit of dividend, any consumer must pay
τ units of consumption good.
Each household i takes the sequence of prices (p, q, r) := (pt, qt, rt)∞t=0 as given, and
solves the following program:
(Pi(p, q, r)) : max
(ci,t,ki,t+1,ai,t)∞t=0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtiui(ci,t)
]
(1)
subject to : ki,t+1 ≥ 0 (2)
pt(ci,t + ki,t+1 − (1− δ)ki,t) + qtai,t
≤ rtki,t + qtai,t−1 + ptξt(1− τ)ai,t−1 + θitpit (3)
(qt+1 + (1− τ)pt+1ξt+1)ai,t ≥ −fi
[
pt+1(1− δ) + rt+1
]
ki,t+1. (4)
where ki,00 and ai,−1 are given. The exogenous parameter fi ∈ [0, 1] which is set by law,
represents the borrowing limit of agent i. This parameter can be viewed as an index of
financial development. At date t, pit is the firm’s profit, (θit)mi=1 is the exogenous share
of profit with θit ≥ 0 for any i and t, and
m∑
i=1
θit = 1 for any t.
In our model, consumers can borrow by using the financial asset but they face
borrowing constraints. Agent i can borrow an amount if the repayment of this amount
does not exceed a fraction of the market value of her (physical) capital income (including
returns and depreciation). In other terms, the physical capital plays the role of
collateral. The fraction fi is less than 1 to ensure that the market value of collateral
of each agent is greater than her debt. At equilibrium, as we will see (after Lemma 1),
the borrowing constraint (4) becomes equivalent to qtai,t ≥ −fiptki,t+1.
The government
In our model, the government levies tax on dividends and uses it to invest in research
and development (R&D). The government fixes the tax rate τ on dividends. The
aggregate tax is denoted by Tt (in terms of consumption good). By construction, we
4This is the case where fi = 0 for any i. See constraint (4).
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have
Tt =
m∑
i=1
τξtai,t−1.
Let us denote by Gt the government spending at date t. In the spirit of Barro
(1990), we assume that the government spending in R&D will affect the productivity
of the firm at the next date. More precisely, the production function at date t is
given by Fg(Gt−1, ·) with Fg(G,K) = f(G)F (K) where f is an increasing function and
f(0) = 1. F is the original production function without government spending in R&D.
If G = 0, then Fg(G,K) = F (K) and we recover Le Van and Pham (2016).
Firm
At date t, the representative firm takes prices (pt, rt) and government spending Gt−1
as given and maximizes its profit by choosing the physical capital amount Kt.
(P (pt, rt, Gt−1)) : pit := max
Kt≥0
[
ptFg(Gt−1, Kt)− rtKt
]
. (5)
The production function at date t is Fg(Gt−1, ·) which is non-stationary and depends
on the government’s spending at date t− 1.
2.1 Equilibrium
We denote an infinite-horizon sequence of prices and quantities by
(p, q, r, (ci, ki, ai)mi=1, K,G, T )
with (x) := (xt)t≥0 for x ∈ {p, q, r, ci, ai, K,G, T} and (ki) := (ki,t+1)t≥0 for any i.
The economy is denoted by E and is characterized by a list
E :=
(
(ui, βi, ki,0, ai,−1, fi, θi)mi=1, F, f, (ξt)∞t=0, δ, τ
)
.
Definition 1. A list
(
p¯t, q¯t, r¯t, (c¯i,t, k¯i,t+1, a¯i,t)mi=1, K¯t, G¯t, T¯t
)∞
t=0
is an equilibrium of the
economy E if the following conditions are met.
(i) Price positivity: p¯t, q¯t, r¯t > 0 for t ≥ 0.
(ii) Market clearing conditions: for any t ≥ 0,
good:
m∑
i=1
(c¯i,t + k¯i,t+1 − (1− δ)k¯i,t) = f(G¯t−1)F (K¯t) + (1− τ)ξt,
capital: K¯t =
m∑
i=1
k¯i,t,
financial asset:
m∑
i=1
a¯i,t = 1,
(iii) Optimal consumption plans: for any i, (c¯i,t, k¯i,t+1, a¯i,t)∞t=0 is a solution of the
problem (Pi(p¯, q¯, r¯)).
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(iv) Optimal production plan: for any t ≥ 0, K¯t is a solution of the problem (P (p¯t, r¯t, G¯t−1)).
(v) Government: G¯t = T¯t where T¯t =
m∑
i=1
τξta¯i,t−1.
At equilibrium, we have Gt = Tt = τξt. Therefore, the consumption market clearing
condition writes
Ct +Kt+1 +Gt = f(Gt−1)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + ξt, (6)
where Ct :=
∑m
i=1 ci,t, Kt :=
∑m
i=1 ki,t. The output of the economy is f(Gt−1)F (Kt) +
(1 − δ)Kt + ξt and decomposes into three parts: private consumption Ct, private
investment Kt+1 and public investment Gt.
In the rest of this paper, if we do not explicitly mention, the following standard
assumptions are required.
Assumption (H1). ui is C1, strictly increasing and concave with ui(0) = 0 and
u′i(0) =∞.
Assumption (H2). The function F (·) is C1, strictly increasing, concave with F (0) ≥
0, F (∞) =∞. The function f(·) is increasing and f(0) = 1.
Assumption (H3). For every t ≥ 0 and 0 < ξt <∞.
Assumption (H4). ki,0, ai,−1 ≥ 0, and (ki,0, ai,−1) 6= (0, 0) for i = 1, . . . ,m. Moreover,
m∑
i=1
ai,−1 = 1 and K0 :=
m∑
i=1
ki,0 > 0.
Assumption (H5).
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(Dt) <∞ where
D0 := Fg(ξ0, K0) + (1− δ)K0 + ξ0,
Dt := Fg(ξt−1, Dt−1) + (1− δ)Dt−1 + ξt ∀t ≥ 0.
Before presenting equilibrium analysis, we prove the existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (H1, H2, H3, H4, H5), there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
It should be noticed that the equilibrium in the current paper is with externalities
on the productivity. The detailed proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix A.
Price normalization: Since pt > 0 ∀t at equilibrium, in the rest of the paper, we
will normalize by setting pt = 1 ∀t. In this case, we also call
(
qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)mi=1, Kt, Gt, Tt
)
t
an equilibrium.
2.2 Basis properties
Let
(
qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)mi=1, Kt, Gt, Tt
)
t
be an equilibrium. Denote by µi,t and νi,t+1
the multipliers associated to the budget and the borrowing constraint of the agent i at
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date t. Denote λi,t+1 the multiplier associated with constraint ki,t+1 ≥ 0. We obtain
βtiu
′
i(ci,t) = µi,t (7)
µi,t = (rt+1 + 1− δ)(µi,t+1 + fiνi,t+1) + λi,t+1 (8)
qtµi,t = (qt+1 + (1− τ)ξt+1)(µi,t+1 + νi,t+1). (9)
Notice that ki,t+1λi,t+1 = 0 and
νi,t+1
[(
qt+1 + (1− τ)ξt+1
)
ai,t + fi
(
1− δ + rt+1
)
ki,t+1
]
= 0.
The following lemma sums up the FOCs.
Lemma 1 (non-arbitrage condition).
qt+1 + (1− τ)ξt+1
qt
= 1
max
i
{µi,t+1
µi,t
} ≥ rt+1 + 1− δ (10)
for any t. Moreover, the inequality holds with equality if Kt+1 > 0.
According to Lemma 1, we have that
fi(1− δ + rt+1)ki,t+1 = fi qt+1 + (1− τ)ξt+1
qt
ki,t+1. (11)
Therefore, borrowing constraint (4) is equivalent to qtai,t ≥ −fiki,t+1.
It should be noticed that in our model with borrowing constraints, we only have the
following Euler inequality, instead of Euler equation as in the representative consumer
model without financial frictions,
1 ≥ (rt+1 + 1− δ) max
i
{
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
}
. (12)
3 The role of dividend taxation
3.1 How to use dividend taxation to avoid recession?
We consider the specific definition of recession introduced by Le Van and Pham (2016).
In Section 3.2, a more general case will be treated.
Definition 2 (recession). The productive sector experiences a recession at date t if no
one invests in this sector, that is the aggregate capital equals zero (Kt = 0).
Consumers diversify their portfolio by investing in capital and the financial asset.
The real return on physical capital is rt+1 + 1− δ, and the physical capital’s maximum
return is F ′(0) + 1 − δ. The real return on the financial asset is qt+1+(1−τ)ξt+1
qt
. By
comparing these two returns, Le Van and Pham (2016) obtain the following result.
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Proposition 2. Consider the case without government (i.e., τ = 0). Assume that
F ′(0) ≤ δ and there exists ξ > 0 such that ξt ≥ ξ for every t ≥ 0. Then, there is an
infinite sequence (tn)∞n=0 such that Ktn = 0 for every n ≥ 0.
Proposition 2 shows that if the original productivity is low (in the sense that F ′(0) <
δ) and there is no R&D investment, recessions will appear at infinitely many dates.
Since the bound ξ does not depend on technology, the cause of economic recession is
no longer the financial market, but the low productivity. Proposition 2 suggests that
we should invest in R&D to improve the productivity and avoid recessions. In what
follows, we will focus on the role of R&D. For simplicity, we consider a simple case
where ξt = ξ > 0 for any t and f(x) = (1 + bx)α1 with α1 > 0, and the positive
parameter b represents the efficiency of the R&D process.
We denote by ρi ≡ 1/βi − 1 which may be interpreted as the exogenous subjective
interest rate of agent i. We have the following result showing how recession can be
avoided.
Proposition 3. Assume that ξt = ξ > 0 for any t and f(x) = (1 + bx)α1 with α1 > 0.
Then, Kt > 0 if
(1 + bτξ)α1F ′(0) > δ + max
i=1,...,m
ρi. (13)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Condition (13) means that the return from the productive sector is higher than the
investment cost. In this case, someone is willing to invest in the productive sector and
recession is avoided. It should be noticed that condition (13) is satisfied if productivity
F ′(0) and/or R&D efficiency b and/or dividend ξ are high.
Proposition 3 has an interesting implication. Consider a "bad" technology F (in
the sense that F ′(0) < δ). In this case, without taxation on dividends, there is no
R&D investment and the recession will arise at infinitely many dates (according to
Proposition 2). When the government levies tax on asset dividends to finance efficient
R&D (in the sense of condition (13)), the economy never falls in recession.
However, we would like also to point out that, given a low initial productivity,
recession becomes unavoidable if the R&D is inefficient and dividends are low. Formally,
we have.
Proposition 4. Assume that ξ¯ := supt ξt < ∞ and ξ := inft ξt > 0 with f(x) =
(1 + bx)α1 and (1 + bτ ξ¯)α1F ′(0) ≤ δ. Then, there exists a sequence (tn)∞n=0 such that
Ktn = 0 for every n ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
We now provide some implications of Propositions 3 and 4.
1. Human capital. Let us introduce the human capital in the production function:
F (K)Lα1 . Our model can be also interpreted as an economy with exogenous labor
supply L0 = 1. With a government spending in human capital, the effective labor
becomes (1 + bGt)L0 and the marginal productivity (with respect to capital)
F ′(K)(1 + bGt)α1 . In this case, all the above results still hold and we would say
that recession in the productive sector may be prevented if the government uses
the tax on dividends to invest in human capital.
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2. Taxes on land dividends.
If fi = 0 for any i, we recover the asset structure of land: an agent buys land
today to receive fruits (i.e., consumption good) tomorrow as land dividends and
resell land thereafter. Proposition 3 shows that a good government is able to
prevent recessions when land dividends are high enough. This interpretation
leads to another interesting remark. Focus on a two-sector economy: agriculture
(represented by land) and industry (represented by a firm). In this case, if the
productivity F ′(0) of the industrial sector is low, the government may collect
taxes on land dividends to finance R&D activities and, therefore, to improve the
industrial productivity and shelter this sector from recessions. In some cases,
this strategy not only avoids recession but also creates more consumption good.
In Section 4, the issue of optimal tax level will be addressed.
3.2 Dividend taxation and economic growth
Consider now a more general concept of recession than Definition 2.
Definition 3. There is a k¯-recession in the productive sector at date t if Kt ≤ k¯.
We have the following result which generalizes Proposition 4.
Proposition 5. Assume that ξ¯ := supt ξt < ∞ and ξ := inft ξt > 0 with f(x) =
(1 + bx)α1 and (1 + bτ ξ¯)α1F ′(k¯) ≤ δ. Then, there exists a sequence (tn)∞n=0 such that
Ktn ≤ k¯ for every n ≥ 0.
The proof of Proposition 5 is similar to that of Proposition 4. According to
Proposition 5, k¯-recessions will appear at infinitely many dates if b, ξt and productivity
are low. However, we will prove that k¯-recessions can be prevented when dividends are
high enough. First, we require an additional assumption on utility functions.
Assumption 1. For each function ui, there exists the function yi(·): R+ → R+ such
that
(1) yi(x) > 0 and y′i(x) > 0 for any x > 0. Moreover, limx→∞ yi(x) =∞.
(2) Given x > 0, we have (u′i)−1
(
u′i(a)
x
)
≥ yi(x)a for any a > 0, where (u′i)−1 is the
inverse function of u′i.
Notice that Assumption 1 is satisfied with standard utility functions. For example,
if u′i(c) = c−σ with σ ∈ (0, 1], then yi(x) = x
1
σ .
According to point 2 of this assumption, condition u′i(a) ≥ xu′(b) implies that
b ≥ yi(x)a. Combining this with the following Euler inequality
u′i(ci,t−1) ≥
(
f(τξ)F ′(Kt) + 1− δ
)
βiu
′
i(ci,t).
we can show that consumption at date t is higher an endogenous proportion of consumption
at the next date. This is the key argument to obtain our main results in this section.
First, we show that a k¯−recession can be avoided if dividends are high enough.
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Proposition 6. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. We assume that (1) ξt = ξ > 0 for any
t, (2) f(x) = (1 + bx)α1.
Given k¯ > 0, there exists ξ¯ such that Kt > k¯ for any ξ > ξ¯ and for any t ≥ 1 .
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
We may wonder whether the dividend taxation can be growth-enhancing. The next
result shows the important role of dividend taxation and efficient R&D in economic
growth.
Proposition 7. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. We assume that (1) ξt = ξ > 0 for any
t, (2) f(x) = (1 + bx)α1, and (3) F ′(K) ≥ A > 0 for any K.
Then, we have lim
t→∞Kt =∞ at equilibrium if
x := min
i
{
yi
(
βi
(
f(τξ)A+ 1− δ
))}
> 1 (14)
and xf(τξ)
f(τξ) + 1−δ+x
A
> 1. (15)
where the function yi(·) is defined in Assumption 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Different from Proposition 6, in Proposition 7 we require condition F ′(K) ≥ A > 0
∀K, which is essential to obtain economic growth. Indeed, if F ′(∞) = 0, we can prove,
by using the following condition
Ct +Kt+1 ≤ (1− δ)Kt + f(ξ)F (Kt) + ξ (16)
that, given ξ and the function f , the sequence (Kt) is uniformly bounded from above.
Comparative statics. By definition, x increases in τξ and A, and hence conditions
(14, 15) are more likely satisfied if τξ, b, A are high. It means that dividend taxation
and efficiency of R&D process play the key role on growth.
Proposition 7 has an interesting implication. To see the point, let us consider a
simple case with linear technology F (K) = AK and the productivity is low in the
sense that A < δ.
1. If there is no dividend (ξt = 0 for any t), then, according to (6), we have Kt+1 ≤
(A+ 1− δ)Kt for any t, which implies that lim
t→∞Kt = 0: the economy collapses.
2. In the case with constant positive dividend (ξt = ξ > 0 for any t), Proposition
7 suggests that, if the government levies taxes on asset dividends and invests
in R&D or human capital (in the sense of condition (14), (15)), growth will be
unbounded.
Our result is related to the literature on optimal growth with increasing returns
(Jones and Manuelli, 1990; Kamihigashi and Roy, 2007; Bruno et al., 2009). Our
added-value is twofold. First, we point out the role of dividend taxation which can
provide investment in R&D, and thanks to this, the host country may grow. Second,
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we consider a decentralized economy while these authors study centralized economies.
Working in a general equilibrium framework is more difficult than in optimal growth
context. The reason is that, in general equilibrium context, there does not exist
a representative agent who chooses the level of aggregate capital Kt to maximize
her intertemporal utility. So, it is not easy to prove some nice properties such at
monotonicity of capital stock (Kt) as in the optimal growth theory (see Le Van and
Dana (2003); Acemoglu (2009) among others).
Acemoglu and Jensen (2015), Datta et al. (2017) study comparative statics of
recursive equilibria. However, intertemporal equilibria in our paper may not be recursive
and therefore their methods cannot be directly applied here. It should also be noticed
that equilibrium indeterminacy may arise in our model (see Proposition 10 in Section
5.1).
3.3 R&D versus other subsidy policies
So far, we have analyzed the impact of dividend taxation and R&D policy. This
section aims to compare this policy with others subsidy policies. Let us consider two
alternative policies: consumption and investment subsidies.
1. Consumption subsidy. In this case, the government uses taxes to produce public
good which increases the utility function of all households. The utility function of
agent i at date t now depends on both her consumption ci,t and public investment
in public good u(ci,t, Gt). The production function in this case is the original
production function: F(K). The good market clearing condition (6) becomes
Ct +Kt+1 +Gt = F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + ξt.
and hence
Kt+1 ≤ F (Kt) + (1− δ)(Kt +Gt−1) + ξt. (17)
2. Investment subsidy. In this case, the production function has the following form:
Fg(G,K) = F (K +G). The good market clearing condition (6) becomes
Ct +Kt+1 +Gt = F (Kt +Gt−1) + (1− δ)Kt + ξt.
and hence
Kt+1 +Gt ≤ F (Kt +Gt−1) + (1− δ)(Kt +Gt−1) + ξt. (18)
If ξ¯ := supt≥0 ξt < ∞ and F ′(∞) < δ, we can prove, by using (17) or (18) that
Kt+1 + Gt is uniformly bounded from above. Hence, consumption and investment
subsidy policies cannot help us to have unbounded growth. In our framework, the only
way to get unbounded growth is to invest in R&D which improves the productivity.
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4 Optimal dividend taxation
When the government raises the tax rate τ , the net dividend (1 − τ)ξt drops but
the production level increases. It is worthy to deepen this trade-off by considering
the optimal taxation on dividends. To this purpose, we assume that the government
chooses τ ∈ [τ , τ¯ ] ⊂ [0, 1], where τ and τ¯ are exogenous parameters,5 in order to
maximize the aggregate consumption at the steady state. Let us start by defining the
steady state formally.
Definition 4. Assume that ξt = ξ > 0 and τt = τ ∈ [0, 1] for any t. A steady
state is an equilibrium
(
qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)mi=1, Kt, Gt, Tt
)
t
such that qt = q, rt = r,
ci,t = ci, ki,t = ki and ai,t = ai for any i and t, and Kt = K, Gt = G and Tt = T for
any t.
We provide now sufficient conditions for steady state uniqueness.
Lemma 2. Let β1 > βi for any i ≥ 2 and fi < 1 for any i. Assume also that
ξt = ξ, τt = τ ∈ [0, 1] for any t and that F is strictly concave and linear with F ′(0) =∞.
Then, there is a unique steady state:
1 = β1
(
f(τξ)F ′(K) + 1− δ
)
(19)
r = f(τξ)F ′(K) and q = (1− τ)ξβ11− β1 (20)
k1 = K, ai = 1 and c1 = (r − δ)K + θ1pi + (1− τ)ξ (21)
ai = ki = 0 and ci = θipi for i = 2, . . . ,m. (22)
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Since β1 > βi for any i = 2, . . . ,m, the borrowing constraints of any consumer
i = 2, . . . ,m are binding. Moreover, the condition fi < 1 for any i implies that no
agent i = 2, . . . ,m will invest in physical capital.6 Hence, the income of any agent
i = 2, . . . ,m equals their profit share.7
Since the aggregate capital level K is determined by (19) and F is strictly concave,
we see that K is uniquely determined. Moreover, we also see that K is increasing in
β1, τ and ξ, and decreasing in δ. For simplicity, in what follows, we write β instead of
β1.
The aggregate consumption is C = (1 − τ)ξ + f(τξ)F (K) − δK. For the sake
of simplicity, we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function F (K) = AKα with
5 The exogenous parameters τ and τ¯ represent political or institutional constraints that we do not
microfound here.
6If fi = 1 for any i, there may be an equilibrium indeterminacy (in term of assets held by agents).
7Notice that, when there are at least 2 agents, say 1 and 2, whose rates of time preference are
β1 = β2 > βi for any i = 3, . . . ,m, the aggregate capital stock K remains unique and still determined
by (19) but their income distribution depends on their initial distribution of capital.
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α ∈ (0, 1). In this case, we have
K =
(
αAf(τξ)
1
β
+ δ − 1
) 1
1−α
(23)
C = f(τξ)AKα − δK + (1− τ)ξ = B1
(
Af(τξ)
) 1
1−α
+ (1− τ)ξ (24)
where B1 := α
α
1−α
1
β
− 1 + δ(1− α)(
1
β
− 1 + δ
) 1
1−α
.
If f(τξ) = (1 + bξτ)α1 , the government’s problem writes
max
τ∈[τ ,τ¯ ]
[
B1A
1
1−α (1 + bξτ)σ − ξτ
]
(25)
where σ := α11−α . If α1 < 1 − α, then, σ < 1, which implies in turn that the objective
function in (25) is strictly concave.8 By consequence, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 8. Let F (K) = AKα and f(x) = (1 + bx)α1 with α + α1 < 1. There are
three possibilities.
1. If σbB1A
1
1−α ≥ (1 + bτ¯ ξ)1−σ, then τ ∗ = τ¯ .
2. If σbB1A
1
1−α ≤ (1 + bτξ)1−σ, then τ ∗ = τ .
3. If (1+bτξ)1−σ < σbB1A
1
1−α < (1+bτ¯ ξ)1−σ, then τ ∗ is the solution of the following
equation
σbB1A
1
1−α = (1 + bτξ)1−σ.
Comparative statics
Consider the role of parameters b and A that represent R&D efficiency and the original
TFP. Proposition 8 shows that when R&D efficiency b and TFP A are very high (in
the sense of the first point in Proposition 8), the optimal tax rate equals τ¯ , the highest
affordable tax rate. But, when b and A are low (enough), the optimal tax rate equals
τ and the government implements the lowest taxation.
The following result is immediate.
Corollary 1. In the third case of Proposition 8, the optimal level τ ∗ is increasing in
β, A and b, but decreasing in ξ.
Remark 1. When the government objective is a measure of welfare such as the aggregation
of agents’ intertemporal utilities, it is difficult to find closed solutions. Indeed, because
of the financial market imperfections, it may become impossible to provide a closed form
for equilibrium prices: given a tax rate τ , the equilibrium may fail to be unique (see
Proposition 10). Even in the case of uniqueness, equilibrium allocations and prices may
fail to be smooth in τ and the government’s maximization problem becomes a hopeless
challenge.9
8If α1 ≥ 1− α, the objective function is convex and the solution becomes either τ or τ¯ .
9This is different from Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985).
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5 Dividend taxation and asset price bubbles
This section investigates the impact of the dividend tax on asset price and bubbles. We
allow for non-stationary tax (τt) and non-stationary dividends (ξt). Before starting, a
definition of asset bubble is needed. Since Lemma 1 still holds with non-stationary tax
rates τt, we have the following asset-pricing equation:
qt = γt+1(qt+1 + (1− τt+1)ξt+1)
where γt+1 := max
i
βiui(ci,t+1)
ui(ci,t)
is the discount factor of the economy from date t to
date t + 1. Then, we can decompose the asset price q0/p0 (in term of consumption
good at the initial date) into two parts:
q0 =
∞∑
t=1
Qt(1− τt)ξt + lim
T→∞
QT qT
where Qt :=
∏t
s=1 γt is the discount factor of the economy from the initial date to
date t. Following Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford (1997), we define the
fundamental value and bubble of asset.
Definition 5. ∑∞t=1Qt(1 − τt)ξt is the asset fundamental value. Bubbles exist at
equilibrium if the asset price exceeds the fundamental value: q0 >
∑∞
t=1Qt(1− τt)ξt.
Apply the same argument by Montrucchio (2004) and Le Van et Pham (2014) to
characterize the existence of bubbles.
Proposition 9. Bubbles exist (i.e., lim
t→∞Qtqt > 0) if and only if
∑
t≥1
(1−τt)ξt
qt
<∞.
The following result provides conditions (based in exogenous parameters) under
which bubbles are ruled out.
Corollary 2. Assume that ξt = ξ > 0 for any t. If f(ξ)F ′(∞) < δ and lim supt≥0 τt < 1
for any t, then bubbles are ruled out.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Corollary 2 implies that bubbles are ruled out in a stationary economy and tax
rates are bounded below from 1. So, the effect of dividend taxation on the existence
of bubbles appears only in non-stationary economy or/and when limt→∞ τt = 1.
Proposition 9 and Corollary 2 suggest that bubbles are more likely to exist if (τt)
are high. In the next section, we will study this effect through some examples.
5.1 Examples of bubbles: the role of dividend taxation
Although there is a large literature on the non-existence of rational bubble in general
equilibrium models,10 few examples of bubbles of assets having positive dividends have
10See Tirole (1982), Santos and Woodford (1997) or more recently Le Van and Pham (2016).
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been found. In this section, we provide some examples of asset bubbles and look at
the role of dividend taxation. Our examples are inspired by Section 6.1 in Le Van and
Pham (2016).
Fundamentals. Assume that there are 2 consumers H and F . Let ui(c) = ln(c),
βi = β ∈ (0, 1) and fi = 0 for i = {H,F} with δ ∈ (0, 1). Agents’ initial endowments
are given by kH,0 = 0, aH,−1 = 0, kF,0 > 0 and aF,−1 = 1, while their profit shares by:(
θH2t , θ
H
2t+1
)
= (1, 0) ,
(
θF2t, θ
F
2t+1
)
= (0, 1) ∀t ≥ 0.
Focus on a linear production function: F (K) = AK + B, where A,B > 0 and β(1 −
δ + f(ξ¯)A) ≤ 1 where ξ¯ ≡ supt ξt.11 This production function can be viewed as a
particular case of the function F (K,L) = AK +BL with inelastic labor supply (equal
to one). Notice that Fg(Gt−1, Kt) = f(τt−1ξt−1)(AKt + B) and pit = f(τt−1ξt−1)B for
any t.
Equilibrium. Let us now construct an equilibrium. The allocations of consumer H
are given by
kH,2t = 0, aH,2t−1 = 0 (26)
cH,2t−1 = (1− δ + r2t−1)K2t−1 + q2t−1 + (1− τ2t−1)ξ2t−1 (27)
kH,2t+1 = K2t+1, aH,2t = 1 (28)
cH,2t = pi2t −K2t+1 − q2t (29)
while the allocations of consumer F by
kF,2t = K2t, aF,2t = 1 (30)
cF,2t−1 = pi2t−1 −K2t − q2t−1 (31)
kF,2t+1 = 0, aF,2t = 0 (32)
cF,2t = (1− δ + r2t)K2t + q2t + (1− τ2t)ξ2t. (33)
Prices and the aggregate capital solve the following system: for any t,
Kt+1 + qt =
β
1 + β (Ft(Kt)− rtKt) = Bt (34)
qt+1 + (1− τt+1)ξt+1 = qt(rt+1 + 1− δ) (35)
qt > 0, Kt > 0 (36)
with pt = 1 and rt = f(τt−1ξt−1)A, where Bt := βf(τt−1ξt−1)B1+β .
By using Lemma 3 in Appendix A.8, we can prove that any sequence of allocations
and prices satisfying the above conditions is an equilibrium.
The asset fundamental value is equal to FV :=
∞∑
s=1
(1− τs)ξsQs where
Qs :=
1
(1− δ + f(τ0ξ0)A) · · · (1− δ + f(τs−1ξs−1)A)
11Condition β(1− δ+ f(ξ¯)A) ≤ 1 ensures that FOCs are satisfied. This and condition (13) are not
mutually exclusive since (13) implies Kt > 0. However, in some cases, we do not need (13) to have
Kt > 0.
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is the discount factor of the economy.
It is easy to see that FV is decreasing in τt for any t. However, FV is not monotonic
in dividend ξt while the fundamental value of the asset in Section 6.1 in Le Van and
Pham (2016) is increasing in dividends. This difference is from the fact that the
interest rates and discount factors in our example depend on dividends through R&D
investment.12 Notice that if τt = 0 ∀t, we recover Le Van and Pham (2016).
To find an equilibrium, we have to find a sequence (Kt+1, qt)t≥0 satisfying the system
(34, 35, 36). To do so, we choose q0 ≥ FV and (qt)t≥1 such that
q0 =
t∑
s=1
(1− τs)ξsQs + qtQt (37)
qt <
βf(τt−1ξt−1)B
1 + β . (38)
Condition (38) ensures that Kt+1 > 0. Condition q0 ≥ FV implies that qt > 0 for any
t. Hence, such a sequence (qt)t≥0 is a sequence of equilibrium prices because it satisfies
the system (34, 35, 36). In this case, a bubble exists when q0 > FV . Summing up, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 10 (continuum of equilibria). Any sequence (qt) with q0 ∈ [FV,B0) and
(qt)t≥1 satisfying (37, 38) is a sequence of equilibrium price.
If q0 = FV , then the equilibrium is bubbleless.
If If q0 > FV , then the equilibrium is bubbly.
Our result is also related to Tirole (1985) where he shows that there may be
continuum of bubbly equilibria. The difference is that Tirole (1985) works in an
overlapping generations model without financial frictions while we consider an infinite-horizon
general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints.
Let us provide some implications of Proposition 10.
• Asset bubble and dividend taxes. Since q0 ≥ FV , Proposition 10 indicates
that FV is the minimum level above which q0 is an equilibrium price with bubbles.
It is easy to see that FV is decreasing in each τt. Thus, we concludes that bubbles
are more likely to appear when sequence of tax τt increases. The intuition is that,
when the tax rates τt increases, the after-tax dividend (1 − τt)ξt decreases and
the financial asset fundamental value may turn out to be lower than its price. In
this case, an asset bubble arises.
• Asset price and dividend taxes. In Proposition 10, let q0 = FV + d¯ with
d¯ ∈ [0, B0 − FV ), and then bubbles arise. According to (37), we can compute
12Indeed, given ξt, we write
FV =
( t−1∑
s=1
(1− τs)ξsQs
)
+ (1− τt)ξtQt +
∞∑
s=t+1
(1− τs)ξs QsQt+1
(1− δ + f(τ0ξ0)A) · · · (1− δ + f(τtξt)A)
The first term do not depend on ξt. The second term increases in ξt but the last term decreases in ξt.
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the asset price at date t as follows
qt =
(
(1− δ + f(τ0ξ0)A
)
· · ·
(
1− δ + f(τt−1ξt−1)A
)
d¯
+
∞∑
s=t+1
(1− τs)ξs
(1− δ + f(τtξt)A) · · · (1− δ + f(τs−1ξt−1)A) (39)
It is easy to see that qt is increasing τs for any s ≤ t− 1 but decreasing in τs for
any s ≥ t.
6 Conclusion
We have proved that a low productivity entails recessions at infinitely many dates.
However, when the government taxes the consumers’ dividends and spend this fiscal
revenue to invest in R&D activities, the productivity of firms is enhanced and recession
may be avoided. This happens if: (1) the R&D process is efficient or (2) dividends are
high. The economy may grow without bounds when the R&D process becomes very
efficient.
Some steady state analyses have been studied. For example, given the objective
function is the aggregate consumption, the optimal level of dividend taxation increases
in the R&D efficiency the TFP, but decreases in the level of dividends. Moreover, we
have also shown that equilibrium indeterminacy may arise. In this case, asset bubbles
are more likely to appear if dividend taxes increases.
A Appendix: Formal proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The existence of equilibrium. We consider the intermediate economy E˜ as the economy
E but the government is not taken into account. Denote ξ˜t := (1−τ)ξt and the function
F˜t defined by F˜t(K) := Fg(τξt−1, K). According to Le Van and Pham (2016), there
exists an equilibrium
(
p˜t, q˜t, r˜t, (c˜i,t, k˜i,t+1, a˜i,t)mi=1, K˜t
)∞
t=0
of the economy E˜ , i.e., the
following conditions hold:
1. p˜t, q˜t, r˜t > 0 for t ≥ 0.
2. For any t ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
(c˜i,t + k˜i,t+1 − (1− δ)k˜i,t) = F˜t(K˜t) + (1− τ)ξt (A.1)
K˜t =
m∑
i=1
k˜i,t (A.2)
m∑
i=1
a¯i,t = 1. (A.3)
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3. Optimal consumption plans: for any i, (c˜i,t, k˜i,t+1, a˜i,t)∞t=0 is a solution of the
problem (Pi(p˜, q˜, r˜)).
4. Optimal production plan: for any t ≥ 0, K¯t is a solution of the following problem
max
Kt≥0
[
p˜tF˜t(K˜t)− r˜tK˜t
]
. (A.4)
It is easy to see that
(
p˜t, q˜t, r˜t, (c˜i,t, k˜i,t+1, a˜i,t)mi=1, K˜t, Gt, Tt
)∞
t=0
, where Gt = τξt, Tt =
τξt, is an equilibrium the economy E .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
If Kt+1 = 0, we have
m∑
i=1
ci,t = F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + (1− τ)ξ,
m∑
i=1
ci,t+1 +Kt+2 = F (0) + (1− τ)ξ.
Therefore, we have
m∑
i=1
ci,t ≥ F (0) + (1− τ)ξ ≥
m∑
i=1
ci,t+1. (A.5)
Consequently, there exists i ∈ {1, · · · ,m} such that ci,t ≥ ci,t+1, hence u′i(ci,t+1) ≥
u′i(ci,t). Thus, we have that
1
(1 + bτξ)α1F ′(0) + 1− δ ≥ maxj
βju
′
j(cj,t+1)
u′j(cj,t)
≥ βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
≥ βi
So 1 ≥
(
(1 + bτξ)α1F ′(0) + 1− δ
)
βi, contradiction!
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We claim that there exists an infinite increasing sequence (tn)∞n=0 such that qtn + (1−
τ)ξtn > qtn−1 for every n ≥ 0.
Indeed, if not, there exists t0 such that qt+1 + (1 − τ)ξt+1 ≤ qt for every t ≥ t0.
Combining with ξt ≥ ξ for every t ≥ 0 and by using induction argument, we can easily
prove that
qt0 ≥ qt+t0 + t(1− τ)ξ
for every t ≥ 0. Let t→∞, we have qt0 =∞, contradiction!13
13Our result is still valid if the condition "ξt ≥ ξ > 0 for every t ≥ 0" is replaced by "
∞∑
t=0
ξt =∞".
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Therefore, there exists a sequence (tn) such that for every n ≥ 0, qtn + (1− τ)ξtn >
qtn−1. Therefore, by assumptions in Proposition 4, we have
qtn + (1− τ)ξtn
qtn−1
> 1 ≥ (1 + bτ ξ¯)α1F ′(0) + 1− δ.
Assume that Ktn > 0. According to Lemma 1, we see that
qtn + (1− τ)ξtn
qtn−1
= (1 + bτξtn)α1F ′(Ktn) + 1− δ < (1 + bτ ξ¯)α1F ′(0) + 1− δ.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, Ktn = 0 for any n.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
We see that
βiu
′
i(ci,t)
u′i(ci,t−1)
≤ max
j
βju
′
j(cj,t)
u′j(cj,t−1)
≤ 1(1 + bτξ)α1F ′(Kt) + 1− δ .
Let us denote Bi(τξ,Kt) :=
(
f(τξ)F ′(Kt) + 1 − δ
)
βi. The above inequality
implies that ci,t ≥ yi(Bi(τξ,Kt))ci,t−1 for any i, where the function yi(·) is defined
in Assumption 1.
Denote
x(τξ,Kt) := min
i
yi(Bi) = min
i
{
yi
(
βi
(
f(τξ)F ′(Kt) + 1− δ
))}
.
Notice that xt increases in bξ (because f(τξ) = (1 + bξτ)α1) but decreases in Kt.
Since ci,t ≥ yi(Bi(τξ,Kt))ci,t−1 for any i, we have Ct ≥ x(τξ,Kt)Ct−1. By market
clearing conditions, we have
Ct−1 +Kt = f(Gt−2)F (Kt−1) + (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− τ)ξ (A.6)
Ct +Kt+1 = f(Gt−1)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + (1− τ)ξ. (A.7)
By consequence, condition Ct ≥ xtCt−1 implies that
f(τξ)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + (1− τ)ξ
≥ Ct ≥ x(τξ,Kt)Ct−1 = xt
(
f(τξ)F (Kt−1) + (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− τ)ξ −Kt
)
.
From this, we have
f(τξ)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + (1− τ)ξ
x(τξ,Kt)
+Kt ≥ f(τξ)F (Kt−1) + (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− τ)ξ
≥ (1− τ)ξ.
Thus, we get
f(τξ)F (Kt)
x(τξ,Kt)
+ (1− δ)Kt
x(τξ,Kt)
+Kt ≥ (1− τ)ξ x(τξ,Kt)− 1
x(τξ,Kt)
. (A.8)
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By definition, x(τξ,Kt) decreases in Kt, and so does
x(τξ,Kt)− 1
x(τξ,Kt)
. Hence, we have:
for each ξ > 0, there exists a unique K(ξ) such that
f(τξ)F (K(ξ))
x(τξ,K(ξ)) +
(1− δ)K(ξ)
x(τξ,K(ξ)) +K(ξ) = (1− τ)ξ
x(τξ,K(ξ))− 1
x(τξ,K(ξ)) . (A.9)
Since σi < 1 for any i, we see that
f(τξ)
x(τξ,K(ξ)) is decreasing in ξ. Combining with the
fact that x(τξ,K(ξ)) is increasing in ξ, we get that K(ξ) is increasing in ξ.
Moreover, by using Assumption 1 and definition of K(ξ), we see that lim
ξ→∞
K(ξ) =
∞. Consequently, there exists ξ¯ > 0 such that K(ξ¯) > k¯ for any t. Therefore, Kt > k¯
for any t.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
We see that
βiu
′
i(ci,t)
u′i(ci,t−1)
≤ max
j
βju
′
j(cj,t)
u′j(cj,t−1)
≤ 1(1 + bτξ)α1F ′(Kt) + 1− δ ≤
1
(1 + bτξ)α1A+ 1− δ
where the last inequality comes from the fact that F ′(x) ≥ A for any x.
Let us denote Bi :=
(
f(τξ)A + 1 − δ
)
βi. The above inequality implies that
Biu
′
i(ci,t) ≤ u′i(ci,t−1). According to Assumption 1, we get that ci,t ≥ xici,t−1 for
any i, where xi ≡ yi(Bi). Denote x := min
i
yi(Bi). Using the same argument in the
proof of Proposition 6, we have
f(τξ)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + (1− τ)ξ
x
+Kt ≥ f(τξ)F (Kt−1) + (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− τ)ξ
⇒ f(τξ)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + xKt ≥ xf(τξ)F (Kt−1) + x(1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− τ)ξ(x− 1)
≥ xf(τξ)F (Kt−1)
where the last inequality is based on condition x > 1.
Since F (K) ≥ F ′(K)K ≥ AK, we have that
f(τξ)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + xKt = F (Kt)
(
f(τξ) + (1− δ + x)Kt
F (Kt)
)
(A.10)
≤ F (Kt)
(
f(τξ) + 1− δ + x
A
)
. (A.11)
Thus, we get that
F (Kt)
F (Kt−1)
≥ xf(τξ)
f(τξ) + 1−δ+x
A
> 1. (A.12)
By consequence, we obtain that lim
t→∞F (Kt) =∞, and hence limt→∞Kt =∞.
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 2
Let
(
p, q, r, (ci, ki, ai)mi=1, K,G, T
)
be a steady state equilibrium. By FOCs, there exists
xi ≥ 0, and yi ≥ 0 such that
1 = (r + 1− δ)(βi + fixi) + yi (A.13)
q = (q + (1− τ)ξ)(βi + xi) (A.14)
kiyi = 0, xi
(
(q + (1− τ)ξ)ai + fi(1− δ + r)ki
)
= 0. (A.15)
According to (A.14) and β1 > βi for any i ≥ 2, we have x1 = 0 and xi > 0 for any
i ≥ 2 which implies that (q + (1− τ)ξ)ai + fi(1− δ + r)ki = 0 for any i ≥ 2.
Since F ′(0) = ∞, we have r + 1 − δ = q+(1−τξ)
q
= 1
βi+xi . According to (A.13), we
obtain that, for any i,
1 = βi + fixi
βi + xi
+ yi (A.16)
For each i ≥ 2, since xi > 0, and fi < 1, we obtain that yi > 0. Therefore, we get
that ki = 0, and hence ai = 0 for each i ≥ 2. So, we can compute ci = θipi for each
i ≥ 2.
Since F ′(0) =∞ we have K > 0, so k1 = K > 0. According to (A.13), we see that
K is determined by
1 =
(
f(ξτ)F ′(K) + 1− δ
)
β1. (A.17)
It is now easy to obtain that ai = 1 and c1 = (r − δ)K + θ1pi + (1− τ)ξ.
A.7 Proof of Corollary 2
According to (6), we have
Ct +Kt+1 +Gt = f(Gt−1)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + ξt (A.18)
= f((1− τt−1)ξt−1)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + ξt (A.19)
≤ f(ξ)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + ξ. (A.20)
Therefore, Kt+1 < f(ξ)F (Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + ξ. Since f(ξ)F ′(∞) < δ, it is easy to prove
that the capital stock (Kt) is uniformly bounded from above.
By using
∞∑
t=1
Qt(1− τt)ξ <∞ and lim sup
t
τt < 1, we get that
∞∑
t=1
Qt <∞ and hence
lim
t→∞Qt = 0.
Since (Kt) is uniformly bounded from above we have lim
T→∞
QTki,T+1 = 0 for any i,
and ∞∑
t=1
f(τtξ)F (Kt)Qt ≤
∞∑
t=1
f(ξ)F (Kt)Qt <∞.
We can prove that there is no financial asset bubble by using the argument in the
proof of Proposition 8 in Le Van and Pham (2016).
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A.8 A sufficient condition for the equilibrium
Let us denote I := {1, 2, . . . ,m}. We give sufficient conditions for a sequence(
pt, qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)i∈I , Kt, Gt, Tt
)
t
to be an equilibrium. This result is used in our examples in Section 5.1. Notice that
the utility may satisfy ui(0) = −∞.
Lemma 3. Let fi = 0 for any i. A sequence
(
pt, qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t)i∈I , Kt, Gt, Tt
)
t
is
an equilibrium, if the sequence
(
pt, qt, rt, (ci,t, ki,t+1, ai,t, ζi,t, i,t)i∈I , Kt, Gt, Tt
)
t
satisfies
the following conditions.
(i) For any i and t, ci,t > 0, ki,t+1 > 0, ai,t > 0, ζi,t > 0 and i,t > 0.
For any t, pt = 1, qt > 0 and rt > 0.
(ii) The first-order conditions hold
1
rt+1 + 1− δ =
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
+ ζi,t
qt
qt+1 + (1− τt+1)ξt+1 =
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
+ i,t
with ζi,tki,t+1 = 0 and i,tai,t = 0.
(iii) The transversality conditions are satisfied:
lim
t→∞ β
t
iu
′
i(ci,t)ki,t+1 = limt→∞ β
t
iu
′
i(ci,t)qtai,t = 0.
(iv) For any t, Fg(Gt−1, Kt)− rtKt = max
K:K≥0
{Fg(Gt−1, K)− rtK}.
(v) For any t, ci,t + ki,t+1 − (1 − δ)ki,t + qtai,t = rtki,t + (qt + (1 − τt)ξt)ai,t−1 + θitpit
where pit = Fg(Gt−1, Kt)− rtKt.
(vi) For any t, Kt =
∑
i∈I ki,t.
(vii) For any t, ∑i∈I ai,t = 1.
(viii) For any t, Gt = Tt = (1− τt)ξt.
Proof. The proof is left to the reader.
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